Transcript: Germany’s ‘deplorable’ divide on the Ukraine war

This is an audio transcript of the Rachman Review podcast episode: ‘Germany’s ‘deplorable’ divide on the Ukraine war’

[MUSIC PLAYING]

Gideon Rachman
Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week’s podcast comes from Berlin. It’s about Germany, Europe and the war in Ukraine. My guest is Norbert Röttgen, a member of the foreign affairs committee of the German parliament and author of a new book called Democracy and War. In the book, he argues that the outcome of the war will shape Europe’s destiny. So should Germany and the wider west be doing more to support Ukraine?

I met Norbert Röttgen in his office in Berlin, just across the road from the Reichstag building where the German parliament meets. In 2001, Vladimir Putin — just elected as Russia’s president — appeared before the German parliament and spoke of the need for Russia and Germany to be part of a common European home.

Vladimir Putin voice clip
[Speaking in German]

Gideon Rachman
Vladimir Putin’s speech made in German was greeted with a standing ovation. But the mood in the Bundestag was very different more than 20 years later. In February 2022, just five days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz rose to his feet and announced the Zeitenwende, a historic turning point, which would see Germany sharply increase defence spending in response to the threat from Russia.

Olaf Scholz voice clip
[Speaking in German]

Gideon Rachman
Scholz, like Putin a generation earlier, was greeted with a standing ovation. But Norbert Röttgen believes that the Scholz government has not followed through on its rhetoric and that its inaction is putting Germany and Europe in danger. When we met in Berlin, I asked him to justify his claim that the outcome of the war is at the core of Europe’s destiny.

Norbert Röttgen
It is the core because what we experience is the return of war . . . of land war to Europe. It is the end of the longest peace period Europe had enjoyed and experienced. And the very question which Putin has put on the table is: will war remain in Europe? Because war turns out to be successful? Or will the west turn out to be able and determined to banish war from Europe again?

Gideon Rachman
And, you know, the war’s now been going on for over two years. Are you optimistic about the way things are turning out in terms of this question of banishing war as a means of changing the political situation?

Norbert Röttgen
On the one side, of course, nearly everybody was convinced when the war broke out that this is a matter of days or weeks and then Kyiv will be forced to surrender. Now we have two and a half years and a remarkable resistance of Ukraine against this war. We have measured against the backdrop of the past, remarkable support, military support, western support for Ukraine in numbers of money. However, this support has proven to be insufficient. We are sending too little, often too late, and sometimes not at all, like Germany in the case of the cruise missile Taurus. And this has, of course, military consequences. What is now the military situation is characterised by a superiority of Russia regarding ammunition, weapons.

Ukraine is running out of weapons and ammunition. And as a consequence of that, might start to run out of people, of soldiers. Now, we have to say that Russia has gained the upper hand, not in terms that Russia is able to conquer raids, that is, of Ukrainian territory, but it’s creeping forward permanently and has gained the upper hand. So it’s a very highly critical military situation.

Gideon Rachman
So given that, I would imagine . . . well, I know that you would suggest that the west significantly increase its support for Ukraine. Do you see that happening, though? You sit here, you know, in the heart of the German capital on the foreign affairs committee. You must know better than anyone else the mood. Do you think it’s likely?

Norbert Röttgen
It’s not the policy of the current government. But then I already have to say it’s not the policy of the chancellor. Two of the three coalition parties — the Liberals and the Green party — would support more delivery of weapons to Ukraine but the chancellor has the upper hand.

Gideon Rachman
And your own party, which lies in opposition to the CDU, what’s its position?

Norbert Röttgen
It’s unanimously supporting more weapons and ammunition delivery. We are supportive of the delivery of the Taurus cruise missiles. So this CDU-CSU has really a clear stance on this for doing more, of course, out of solidarity for Ukraine. But first and foremost, I would even say it, out of a sober analysis of our own interests, if this war is not stopped in Ukraine, war will prevail and war will extend and it will come closer to us. So we are not just giving it to Ukraine out of solidarity in order to support them, but it is our own interest that is at stake. And not only some interests, but the very fundamental interests of security and the absence of war and to make war a failure.

And this is supported by a majority of our people, of the electorate. We have a majority in the German Bundestag, CDU-CSU, Greens and Liberals. However, the chancellor is avoiding this majority to materialise. So there is an opportunity that the policy in Germany changes, not with this chancellor.

Gideon Rachman
Just to clarify the political situation here, I mean, you say there is a majority in the Bundestag foreign policy that isn’t the chancellor’s. On the other hand, if you look at recent elections, the rising forces in Germany seem to be the extreme right, the AfD. I don’t know how you characterise the Sahra Wagenknecht party, but it’s a mix of left and right, but very strongly against aid to Ukraine. Even if they’re only a third of voters, is there a danger or can you see it already happening that mainstream politicians, the big parties, begin to say, actually, maybe we need to accommodate some of that, this sort of reluctance, even in some cases pro-Putin sentiment?

Norbert Röttgen
First I would say, in a democracy, if you’re facing opposition to a certain piece of policy of a quartile or even a third of the electorate, this does not constitute a problem. We do not need to have 100 per cent support. So this is a democratic controversy and there is nothing bad about it. However, the point you make shows two things: the one is that we admittedly have a deplorable divide on the questions of this war and the stance to Nato and the United States and Russia and Putin between the east and the west. This is — as I regard it — is a serious German problem.

Gideon Rachman
The east and the west of Germany.

Norbert Röttgen
The east and the west of Germany. In the east, in the new Bundesländer, the new member states of Germany are leaning much more favourably to Putin, being much more critical regarding the support of Ukraine and so on, which is specific German problem. And we should regard it as a problem which has to be addressed.

The other point, and this is a major point in my book, is that I see this connection between the external crises and the internal crises of western democracy and the fact that the populists, which are rising because our democracies are in a state of crisis, that they jump to war as their policy issue where they can stir fears and emotions, is not surprising at all. So it’s a typical populist issue and in the centre of our society, we really have remained a remarkable strong support — 60 per cent, 65 per cent support the cause of the government or take the view that Germany can do more to support Ukraine.

Gideon Rachman
Yet you write in the book that German politics are at a momentous watershed. What do you mean by that?

Norbert Röttgen
If we remember how the situation was before the 24th of February 2022, before the war broke out, then we have to admit that there was a predominant pacifist mood in Germany. There were phrases, stereotypes used in foreign policy for years and decades as, for example, that there is no peace in Europe against Russia, only with Russia. All aspects of military defence and so on, including the budget for the defence forces, had not strong support. And there was even a dark side. Germany does not deliver weapons to a party in an ongoing conflict and if you have that situation and the mood of the country in mind and see now the paradigm shift that has occurred in Germany, this is really fundamental and very remarkable.

And now for Germany, contrary to the past when we started after the war with our wish and desire to get reintegrated as a normal, respected member in the international community, when nobody asked for a leadership role of Germany in foreign and security policy, now, Germany has become the decisive, I would say, most important country in Europe for restoring security and peace. We can’t solve this problem alone, but without Germany, none of the big questions and problems, and first and foremost, this war in Europe can be led to a political settlement, if Germany is not active and engaged. And so this is a fundamental break in our history, and it requires that we decide what and who shall Germans and Germany be in this new world.

Gideon Rachman
And you again point to a historic speech that was made, well actually two, you reframe the book rather interestingly, where you start with the speech that Putin gave in the building just across the way, in the Bundestag in 2001 and got a standing ovation for talking about our common European home and then . . . 

Norbert Röttgen
Including me.

Gideon Rachman
Including you. Good for you for admitting it. And then whatever it is, 23 years later, Scholz stands up and announces a few days after the invasion of Ukraine, the Zeitenwende and then the idea that Germany will now spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence, which as you say, is you know . . . 

Norbert Röttgen
And again, I stood up to applause.

Gideon Rachman
Right. Has he followed through that?

Norbert Röttgen
No, unfortunately not. It’s a really big disappointment. He started in a way that could hardly mean better with this speech where he announced and described the watershed moment that now we have to adapt. That this is a moment of our responsibility and so much at stake, and we will live up to the new challenges. But then he has not lived up to his own speech. Yes, of course, there has been support. There have been military support and deliveries, but insufficiently, and from the very beginning against the resistance, against the reluctance of the chancellor, who always argued against it. He even adopted the angst propaganda of Putin by spreading this narrative, by telling the German people that if he decides to deliver, for example, heavy weapons, tanks and so on to Ukraine, we then would cause the threat of nuclear escalation. So this is really unbelievable. And this is the common threat in his Russia and Ukraine policy in the last two and half years, unfortunately. It’s not a matter that I’m a member of the opposition. I would really be ready and willing to applause him if he were to follow his own speech.

Gideon Rachman
How different do you think he’s been from Biden?

Norbert Röttgen
Biden has decided, and the policy of Biden has meant that again, luckily for us Europeans and embarrassing for us Europeans, America has turned out to be the European security power. So it was the Americans and not the Germans. So for this really, he deserves credit and applause. However, when it came to crucial decisions to compensate and rectify the shortcomings and shortages of the Ukrainian forces — long-range missiles, tanks, and to allow that these weapons are used against military targets on Russian territory, which is necessary for self-defence — he has also played a reluctant role and has so far in particular areas resisted the crucial support for Ukraine. So unfortunately, there is a kind of concurrence between the cautious approach of both the German chancellor and the American president.

Gideon Rachman
And given all that, I know where you and a lot of people would like things to head, more at Ukraine to turn around in the war. But in reality, do you think we’re heading towards a situation in which a combination of what’s happening on the battlefield and the west beginning to lose faith leads to Ukraine being forced into peace negotiations in a year or so? I see the chancellor’s already talking about the need for peace negotiations.

Norbert Röttgen
Absolutely. So if the current western policy of support, but insufficient support continues, the military and eventually political consequences will be unavoidable. It will leave Ukraine in a military-weak situation. And out of weakness and pressured by the west, it may then lead to the stop of negotiations. And it will be a bad framing for negotiations when and if Ukraine is forced to negotiate from the position of military weakness.

If this were to happen, and I think it’s still in our hand to avoid it, we will wake up perhaps two years, three years, four years later, and we’ll see that we will have to pay the price for this policy of being not determined enough, not being supportive enough because the bill of that policy will be presented to us and it will become much more expensive then to support. Now, if we don’t support Ukraine in defending Russia on Ukrainian soil, it may happen that we have to defend ourselves on the soil and territory of a Baltic country.

Gideon Rachman
But is there a sense of threat yet here in Germany? Because as you say again in the book, Europe’s had this long period of peace. Germany has had a long period of peace. I guess our adult lives were framed by this miraculous end to the cold war where the wall fell again in this city without violence. I mean, you obviously feel there’s a threat. When I go to Warsaw, I do feel that people there understand the threat. But sitting here in sunny Berlin, I don’t really feel that here in Germany.

Norbert Röttgen
I would not contradict that if you go through Berlin, that you don’t feel it and that there is a different mood in Warsaw, in Riga or in Berlin or Munich. However, I’m absolutely convinced, and the polls are proving this now for more than two and a half years, that Zeitenwende, this watershed has been entrenched and has taken root within a vast majority of the German electorate.

The Zeitenwende has taken place in our people. But it is not followed by a policy. If we had a chancellor who would perhaps, let’s say every two months, give a speech and explain what is necessary, what the strategic goal is and what we are going to do, what we can achieve and what is at stake, and that it is about the highest work you can imagine about peace and freedom in Europe, I would say the mood would even be different. But there is absolutely openness by a majority to listen to political leadership, if it were a policy and that would follow, I do not have doubts about this. We have a critical mind and people see what is at stake. They are not spoken to. There is a void in leadership, starting with the void of communication.

Gideon Rachman
And is that partly because, well, you’ve made it very clear you think Scholz has failed really as a chancellor to give that sort of leadership. But again, when you talk to voters, read the papers, Ukraine is an important issue. But it seems to me that top of mind for Germans at the moment is migration and also this kind of looming sense of threat to the German economy because the car industry could be in trouble because of the switch to EVs and so on. Am I right in thinking those are the big issues for most voters?

Norbert Röttgen
Yes, of course. But you have a permanent flow of what is the big issue of the day of the week. And if you think briefly about it, then you depict that these topics are all interlinked. We have 1mn Ukrainian refugees in Germany, so you can’t separate the refugee situation in Germany from the war in Ukraine. If we are going to allow Putin to destroy even further the energy production infrastructure in Ukraine, we are going to see much more Ukrainian refugees in Germany because people in Ukraine are going to freeze and to die in a hard winter. So you can’t really separate that and people are seeing that. So this is a permanent issue. It’s there, of course, for two and a half years. And you can’t expect the public, the media to stick for two and a half years to one issue. But it has not gone away. It’s a big issue.

Gideon Rachman
Yeah. And yet, I think that the parties that are winning the votes in the east and you alluded to that different political character, they would say, like you, yes, we are very scared about a war in Europe and Germany returning to an era of war. But the policies that people like Norbert Röttgen are advocating are gonna lead to that war because they’re gonna escalate things. How do you win that argument?

Norbert Röttgen
We have to decide. Do we think that giving in to Putin will lead to restore peace and security in Europe? Do you really think that Putin positively reacts to weakness? Or do we rather think that Putin is absolutely determined, he is fulfilling a historic mission to re-establish the Russian empire? He is escalating with everything which is at his disposal to do. He is committing crimes permanently.

So it’s about war and peace. And we have to do everything to make war a failure, to banish war. And this will only happen with convincing and sufficient military means that open a path to negotiations with Russia. We simply have to decide what is the more plausible path to follow. What is the more convincing peace policy? And we have, I think, to present and make our arguments for that. I’m quite confident that a big majority in Germany is convinced that weakness is not a good recipe to come to Putin, but it’s up to the people and we should put it to the people and make it an issue to be decided and voted on in the next federal election.

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Gideon Rachman
That was Dr Norbert Röttgen, a member of the German parliament for the Christian Democrats and author of the new book War and Democracy. That’s it for now. Thanks for listening. And please join me again next week for another edition of the Rachman Review.